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We discuss a high-level model for software 
applications and services that can support a minimal 
set of human-centric trust management capabilities. 
We outline the unique set of challenges we must 
address if we are to attain a level of trust that will be 
required for a robust deployment of an IoT. We 
discuss the role of standards and how we can 
maximize the effectiveness of standards and device 
and service certification. We suggest a set of 
solutions for trust management that can support the 
unique security, safety, and privacy requirements of a 
robust IoT. Prominent among these solutions is the 
use of an older approach for access control, viz. the 
reference monitor, and blockchain technologies that 
can record trust and policy graphs and trust-related 
attributes for IoT devices and supporting services. An 
open, but governed trust blockchain can serve as a 
universal trusted oracle. 
 
1. Introduction  
 
More than any technology that has ever emerged 
so far, the Internet of Things (IoT) represents an 
evolution of computing that challenges our ability to 
manage the safety and security of our environment. 
As technologies are developed and introduced into 
the world, we rarely understand the full implications 
of their use, or even how dominant they may be 
come. This was true of the mobile communications 
industry [1], and the computing industry itself [2]. In 
the past we usually have had time to introduce 
standardized security solutions to deal with new 
threats as they emerge, though it has often been 
painful. The software industry has a long history of 
successfully supporting standards as computing has 
evolved [3].  However, we are now faced with the 
fact that computing technology is evolving faster than 
our ability to contend with the threats we can see 
clearly, much less the threats that will only emerge 
after new technologies are fully ensconced. The fact 
that IoT computing is ubiquitous, pervasive, and is 
now invading the innards of (what were once) the 
simplest of commonplace things, means that the 
number of stakeholders in any standard has increased 
in ways that make establishing consensus much more 
challenging. It may be more prudent to advocate a 
mixture of flexible standard approaches and 
cooperative strategies that address the most imposing 
requirements. This paper nominates some of those. In 
the past computing standards were typically designed 
in response to a desire for interoperability among 
multiple implementations of protocols or software 
components. Now, it is more important that software 
standards for IoT additionally address the need for 
humans to be able to contend with the complexity 
that IoT thrusts upon us, especially where it pertains 
to the ability of people to trust and manage the safety 
and security of IoT devices as well as the impact of 
potential accidental use or nefarious abuse of those 
devices on our lives.  
Some previous works [4-7] address the need for 
new IoT trust models in line with what we propose, 
specifically recognizing the need for a more generally 
effective access control strategy and the usefulness of 
social graphs to accommodate less rigid policies.  
We will continue the discussion as follows: 
• Enumerate the drivers for a new informal 
trust model for the IoT 
• Outline the components of a distributed trust 
model for the IoT that use trust graphs and 
policy graphs 
• Describe solutions based on Blockchain 
technologies that indicate how this model can 
work 
• Describe how to introduce minimal standards 
and cooperative strategies for establishing 
trust in an evolving IoT 
 
2. Drivers for a new IoT Trust Model  
 
We believe that any trust model for IoT needs to 
accommodate the main drivers of its evolution in the 
context of distributed computing. We enumerate 
them here: 
1. Ubiquity and Scale 
2. Hyper-connectivity 





3. Cyber-physical integration 
4. New interaction models  
 
2.1 Ubiquity and scale 
 
Numerous projections have been made of the 
expected growth of the number of Internet connected 
devices [8]. As the numbers progress through the tens 
of billions (and the often-quoted trillions of sensors), 
it becomes obvious that new strategies are needed to 
be able to manage and personalize all of these 
devices. People will own or be asked to interact with 
and /or manage hundreds of IoT devices and in 
industrial settings, often more. We need to find ways 
to tame the complexity that could overwhelm us if 
every device or software designer chooses their own 
unique interaction model.  
Never before has the amount of data about 
individual people and their behavior been produced 
on this scale. New strategies for the governance and 
secure management of these many devices and the 
vast amounts of data they produce will be required to 
ensure that people are not overwhelmed by the IoT’s 




We need to recognize that IoT devices are not just 
connected to the Internet, but rather they are 
connected to one another in myriad ways. This has 
profound implications for trust and security models. 
Individuals who may bring a device into their home 
or need to manage them in an enterprise may have 
little idea of the number of different network 
connections a device can make, and the number of 
different protocols they may use. Additionally, 
network connectivity is constantly changing as 
individuals with their personal area networks move 
throughout their homes, other people’s homes, 
offices, and public places. As automobiles, with their 
burgeoning networks encounter the networks of the 
highway and urban infrastructure, and other 
automobiles, connectivity changes rapidly using 
many modalities, and using many different network 
layers and protocols.  
This has profound implications for both trust and 
security models. It means we cannot rely on network 
security in order to protect ourselves. The weak link 
principle will overwhelm us. There will be no 
reasonable way to tell what device is connected to 
which network. Worse, as we need to worry about 
contamination, we won’t know what device has been 
connected to what network, and what applications 
running on a device may have interacted with what 
applications on a network that may have been 
invaded by hostile entities. This all implies that 
devices and their applications will need to 
increasingly be responsible for self-protection. It is 
the only strategy that scales and deals with the issues 
of hyper-connectivity.  
While device and application self-defense will be 
increasingly necessary, that does not mean that 
devices cannot seek help from trusted sources. We 
will discuss that strategy later. 
 
2.3 Cyber-physical integration 
 
This is perhaps the most obvious driver of a trust 
model for IoT, yet it is not clear that it is fully 
appreciated. Resources in IoT devices do not just 
include processors and memory, but rather they 
include components that can easily be turned into 
weapons and even weapons of mass destruction when 
used in scale. Currently we see ransomware being 
applied to office computers and controllers for 
remote locks, but of course there is no reason this 
cannot go much further as the cyber world integrates 
with critical infrastructure controlling dams, 
electrical grids, etc. This point has been made 
repeatedly, and the threat has been clearly 
instantiated for years (see the stories of the Stuxnet 
virus [9], where there were successful attacks on 
devices that were not even directly network 
connected). Yet, we see deployments of IoT devices 
where little thought has been given regarding 
potential misuse and disruption. That may be all well 
and good for the moment, but as we have seen when 
technologies become fully ensconced in our culture 
and we become increasingly dependent on them, the 
emergence of misuse and abuse inevitably ensues.  
 
2.4 New modes of interaction 
 
As computing evolved, we saw new modes of 
interaction introduced, and sometimes it was not until 
the next stage of evolution that we saw those new 
modes become commonplace. For example, when 
networked computing arrived, mobile code was 
introduced, but when networked computing evolved 
to mobile computing, mobile code (in the form of 
apps) became more dominant and that refined model 
of software distribution and maintenance is even 
being retrofitted to networked desktop computing. As 
an aside, this is a good example of where security 
design kept up (at least somewhat) with the evolution 
of technology. The dominant mobile operating 
systems (IoS sand Android) took the mobile code 
security problem head-on. In fact, their approach can 
evolve to a good approach for IoT security, as 
discussed later.  
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The IoT, as we see it currently evolving, includes 
many relatively new modes of interaction that we 
should model, as they are critical to the trust model. 
IoT human interaction modes have far greater variety 
as humans interact with things through both physical 
and virtual interfaces. Machine to machine 
interactions while not entirely new are introduced in 
a more commonplace way, and devices are linked 
together to form more complex composite devices 
where events on one device trigger events on other 
devices (think the IFTTT service [10], but in an IoT 
context where devices expose services used by other 
devices). Furthermore, IoT devices will increasingly 
come equipped with virtual cloud images and cloud 
services that extend both the capabilities of those 
devices as well as their interaction models. Cloud 
services provide or amplify the “intelligent” 
capabilities of the devices. We see this as another 
class of IoT device interaction. 
The IoT trust model thus needs to address 
security, safety, and privacy aspects of all three 
distinguished classes of interaction: 1) human 
interaction, 2) machine-to-machine (M2M) 
interaction, and 3) cloud services interaction.  
 
2.5 Trust model drivers and “security by 
design” 
 
“Security by design”, “safety and security first” 
and other slogans and aphorisms are of course 
shorthand descriptors that are not well-defined. 
However, if we place them in a trust model context, 
we can begin to develop a process that makes these 
sentiments actionable. Recognizing the drivers, we 
can begin to more comprehensively list threats and 
hazards and prioritize them. In fact, that might be the 
first aspect of a IoT device security standard. The 
device manufacturer will need to show how the 
software on the device provides safety, security, and 
privacy given considerations of scale, connectivity, 
and interaction modes.  
We also must take these sentiments seriously. As 
we have outlined above, IoT is an evolution of 
distributed computing where the scale is enormous, 
the misuse can involve virtually everything, and the 
pathways for spreading mischief and nefarious 
behavior are many.  
The discussion below is meant to allow us to 
focus on IoT device and system design that focuses 
on security, safety, and privacy first.  
 
3. Standard components of an IoT trust 
model  
 
Trust in our context means reliance. Here we ask 
what do we need to rely on in order to enjoy safety, 
security, and privacy when we introduce an IoT 
device into our environment. A standard approach to 
establishing these attributes is to completely list the 
device’s resources. Here are classes of resources that 
we want to see: 
 
• Device controls (anything that can make 
the device do something) 
• State information 
• Sensor information 
• Computing resources (processors, 
memory, embedded programs) 
 
Once we have these enumerated, we ask who can 
have access to them, and how. In the case of a hyper-
connected IoT device the assumption must be that 
everyone has access to all resources, unless there are 
governance mechanisms for the resources. The 
challenge is immediately clear: How to make all of 
this comprehensible to the end user or person 
responsible for deployment and maintenance of the 
device? How do we make it easy for someone to rely 
on the governance mechanisms? This introduces the 
next class of the trust model components, namely 
trusted attributes. Some entity can evaluate and test 
the device and determine that the resources are 
protected, or that they do not pose a hazard, or any 
number of assertions that can relieve a device user or 
manager of responsibility or worry. We will need to 
standardize on both the substance and nomenclature 
for these attributes in ways that ordinary people can 
understand, and we will need to allow policy to 
determine whether to trust some entity that makes 
such assertions. In order to properly deal with the 
complexity thrust upon us by IoT, standardizing on 
trusted attributes will be essential.  
Access to resources on a device will not always 
be static, and so part of the trust model will 
necessarily be means for delegation. If I have an 
electronic lock, I might establish sole control over its 
state, but I may want to give selected others a 
permission. How permissions are established and 
enforced is part of a delegation model that needs to 
be explicitly described, and again should be made 
understandable to ordinary people. This can be very 
tricky however, since delegation mechanisms that are 
truly explicit and don’t rely on faulty assumptions of 
trust transitivity are difficult. The implications of 
delegation need to be accommodated. For example, it 
may not always be apparent that giving a youngster 
access to your home automation system also gives 
them access to safety related mechanisms that they 
may not understand.  
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The previous paragraph serves to introduce us to 
another part of an effective trust model, namely 
performance aids that can help us understand the 
consequences of action, give us guidance, and tame 
complexity. We cannot rely on (i.e. trust) effective 
governance that is neither understandable to an 
average user or overly complex. Trusted performance 
aids (often in the form of web services) will be an 
essential part of an IoT trust model. They will help 
with scale and complexity, especially when we use 
cryptographic key management mechanisms to 
implement a permissions model for resource 
governance across many devices.  
In the course of delegation as well as other tasks 
associated with IoT management, we will need to 
identify things and the entities we want to trust with 
access to their resources. Thus, identity management 
will be an essential high-level component of a trust 
model. This is an area that we know has been 
problematic in the past. It will require a more 
intuitive system for identifying people and other 
entities as well as their attributes. Secure approaches 
to this using hierarchical X.509 and SAML certs have 
already proven inadequate. Below, we describe an 
approach that has a greater chance of dealing with the 
scale and complexity of the IoT.  
Composite devices need to be part of the trust 
model. These can be arrays of physically separate but 
similar devices, or they can be heterogeneous 
assemblies of devices whose union is defined by 
software, often running on the cloud. Such 
composites will become increasingly commonplace 
in order to tame the complexity of device 
management. We will need to recognize the fact that 
while IoT devices are most often designed and 
configured by manufacturers, composite devices will 
more often be defined and configured by end-users 
who may not be subject to the same regulation and 
subject their creations to the same testing and 
certification schemes as device manufacturers. This 
will be a challenge for any IoT trust model. 
 
4. Direction toward some solutions 
 
We cannot possibly describe here adequate 
solutions to the challenges posed by a comprehensive 
IoT trust model. Indeed, we only gave a very high 
level outline of a trust model above. However, we do 
want to point to some relevant approaches to the 
issues identified above. Some approaches are directly 
derived from prior research and experience in 
computer security and others are more speculative 
and will require extensive, forward-looking research 
and development.  We have seen that our challenges 
and requirements are practically overwhelming, yet 
we are attempting to find simpler approaches to 
address them.  
 
4.1 The reference monitor concept 
 
The trust model discussion above began with the 
ability to enumerate resources and then define means 
for governing access to them. The concept of a 
Reference Monitor [11-12]] was first designed in the 
1970s to perform this governance task. One can think 
of a reference monitor as a firewall between the 
“outside world” and the resources provided by a 
device. It is typically implemented as a core (or 
kernel) process that checks each command or request 
against a list of security associations (see below) for 
permissions to take an action or access some 
resource. The idea was used in the Windows NT 
kernel (and later editions), but reference monitors 
have gone out of fashion due to the fact that 
implementation becomes highly difficult when device 
interaction models are complex. Nonetheless, we 
imagine that at least a very simple reference monitor 
should be a part of any IoT device. In fact, the 
simpler the better, and we will need to make sure that 
device interaction models are compact. We 
fundamentally believe that in large scale hyper-
connected deployments of cyber-physical devices we 
cannot afford to support arbitrary multi-tasking, 
multi-user interaction at the end-points. We generally 
do not need to in the IoT. Let’s consider a simple 




The distinguished resources in the device include a 
remote front panel RFP (allowing remote control of 
the devices functions), device state, sensor data, and 
general computing resources. The reference monitor 
intercepts every request to access these resources 
through every communication interface. The requests 
are authenticated using a message authentication 
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code referencing an authentication key that is part of 
a security association record. The key is typically a 
symmetric cryptographic key shared between the 
device and the entity making the request. The 
security association will also include a set of 
permissions for the requesting entity. If the message 
is authenticated, the requesting entity’s identity will 
also be confirmed and the permissions together with 
the device’s root policy will determine access to the 
requested resource. In IoT, we make the assumption 
that general purpose computing resources will rarely 
be referenced except by a small number of entities for 
maintenance purpose.  The RFP, state, and sensors 
will often be involved in P2P entity interaction with a 
limited class of entities, and the security association 
and policy data bases will be referenced by an even 
more restricted set of entities. Under this device 
interaction model, the use of a reference monitor 
seems quite reasonable, and we can make the direct 
to device interaction model even simpler by using the 
“digital twin” concept [13] whereby many 
interactions with the IoT device can be performed via 
an interaction with a virtual digital copy stored in the 
cloud or at a service point accessible to both the 
cloud and the device (gateway). The twin can then 
serve as a distinguished entity with a distinguished 
security association.  
Now a number of issues come to mind: how do 
we establish this explicit security association, and 
isn’t this overkill for simple devices? We want to 
address these questions before continuing further. 
A security association is also a well-worn 
concept in computer security. As mentioned above, 
an IoT device can maintain a list of entities that may 
have permissions to access the resources of a device. 
This will be a table of entries where each entry 
consists of an identity of a remote entity, a symmetric 
cryptographic key shared by the device and the 
remote entity, a list of permissions the remote entity 
has regarding the device’s resources, and some other 
info to help thwart replay attacks. When a command 
comes through an RFP interface, the reference 
monitor will check the message authentication code 
provided by the remote entity. This is a code that can 
only be properly constructed using the shared secret 
key. Unless I have arranged for an entity to have a 
security association with this device, no matter how 
much that entity may have invaded my other network 
devices, or even has access to the LAN, this device 
will not be directly accessible by that entity. Now the 
reader may observe that the device could still be 
attacked if a peer with a proper security association 
has been commandeered. However, the damage may 
be limited by the scope of the permissions granted to 
that peer in the security association data base, and of 
course we presume that peers are likewise protected 
by similar security monitors.  
We advocate that a reference monitor be a 
standard, foundational aspect of all IoT devices, and 
that the governance of device resources be traced to a 
robust reference monitor implementation. This can be 
done while keeping simple things simple. However, 
the skeptic will rightfully observe that we have a 
dependency on cryptographic key management, 
which even in simple systems is hard to properly 
implement. In fact, systems secured using 
cryptography are often successfully attacked through 
the key management system and not by breaking the 
crypto. In addition, permissions management is even 
more complex, with transitive trust issues limiting the 
effectiveness of straightforward solutions. So, we 
next discuss how security associations and key 
management systems can be implemented in a 
scalable way using cloud-based performance aids 
which are part of our trust model. Then we discuss 
more general trust management solutions that can aid 
us in overall IoT device management. 
 
4.2 Security Associations and IoT key 
management 
 
Much of the complexity in the management of 
security associations derives from the complexity of 
security association management protocols. This 
starts with bootstrapping trust and root key 
management. Cloud-based trusted performance aids 
can help us simplify key management from the point 
of view of the end user and also the device designer. 
The IoT trust model must include robust processes 
for cloud service interaction as we mentioned above 
(see the discussion on digital twin). This is a 
distinguished kind of M2M interaction distinctly 
different from the M2M interaction characterized by 
devices acting in concert as composite devices. The 
trust relationship is quite different, and often involves 
trust roots embodied by asymmetric keys whose 
secret parts can be managed by cloud services that 
can afford the resources to properly protect them. We 
expect that humans can interact through a helpful UI 
with web services that can construct virtual images of 
security association tables used by device reference 
monitors, again using the digital twin concept.  
Devices will need to be deployed with root keys 
that can be used to authenticate these web-based 
digital twins and or other trusted performance aids. 
Other than the relatively rare use of an authentication 
key for device renewability, heavy duty 
cryptographic protocols can be avoided in most 
devices, certainly the devices whose IoT interfaces 
only expose an RFP, state and sensor data, and a 
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secure update protocol. It is beyond the scope of this 
paper, but we have designed scalable systems with 
high grades of security that place little burden on the 
device implementation. There are a number of 
considerations not discussed here, but we must say 
that the trust modeling is actually not that simple and 
requires assurances that require restrictions that are 
not always easy to accommodate. An example 
involves protection of root keys. In cases where we 
can severely constrain access to all computing 
resources in a device, and physical invasion of the 
innards of a device is not part of the attack model, 
protecting root keys in IoT devices is not difficult. 
However, in other cases we must employ more 
sophisticated and robust software self-defense 
methods, and hardware security methods. We 
mention, as an aside, that hardware security when 
available, can seem to be a simple solution but it is 
rarely adequate by itself mostly because the interface 
to a specialized secure subsystem needs to be 
carefully implemented and protected. Software 
security and careful design cannot be abdicated.  
For many applications, IoT key management, 
security association management, and delegation of 
authority will require much more sophisticated trust 
management. We will need to have mechanisms that 
identify entities that make trusted statements 
instructing devices or advising people to rely on 
various assertions. While we claim that a simple 
concept of a reference monitor, properly 
implemented can solve our problems. We have just 
deferred the problem to the age-old issue of who 
CAN we trust for what purposes? The network 
security approach to this involves X.509 identity 
certificates and associated SAML certificates for 
trusted assertions [14]. Given the trust model drivers 
discussed above, we cannot rely on this technology 
which even in the hierarchical network security world 
is hard to maintain. With the kinds of IoT interaction 
models we already see emerging, hierarchical trust 
management will not work and does not scale well. 
We do, however, see a solution, discussed in the next 
section. 
 
4.3 Assertion Blockchains and their use in a 
trust management system for IoT 
 
There are numerous proposals for the use of 
Blockchains in IoT applications [15-17]. These 
generally relate to their use for workflows, “smart 
contracts,” and immutable transaction ledgers for 
peer-to-peer IoT interactions, and applications such 
as supply chain management. But, here, we want to 
use blockchains for very basic assertions in trust 
management. 
When introducing the use of blockchains in basic 
distributed computing applications, we hasten to 
disassociate the approach from blockchains designed 
to be used for Internet currencies or distributed 
ledgers designed for other kinds of value exchange. 
We use the term assertion blockchain to denote an 
application using a combination of Merkle hash trees 
and hash chains in combination with an appropriately 
chosen Byzantine Consensus Protocol [18] to 
robustly and immutably record assertions. In this 
case, the assertions will typically correspond to edges 
in a trust graph or policy graph, where a trust graph 
consists of identity nodes, and an edge between nodes 
A and B is labeled with a set of conditions. An edge 
connecting A and B with those conditions means that 
when those conditions are satisfied, A trusts B, or 
sometimes A delegates trust to B.  
A policy graph is used in a decision process, and 
an edge relates a set of conditions to a set of 
permissible actions that can then determine 
conditions that relate to another set of permissible 
actions. 
Governance of IoT resources can be administered 
with the aid of an assertion blockchain, where various 
assertions are referenced iteratively. An IoT assertion 
blockchain will have permissions that are determined 
within the blockchain itself. However, it will also 
incorporate blockchain write permissions for certain 
root assertion types. Here is an example in a 
traditional context that illustrates this: 
I may get an email from someone whose email 
address is abc@xyz.com with an attachment that 
includes a number of statements that say something 
like (PK_- indicates a public key): 
 
“PK_A at time/date said PK_B ia validator for 
email from abc@xyz.com“ 
“PK_C at time/date said PK_A is a validator for 
email from the domain xyz.com” 
“Pk_D at time/date said PK_C is a validator for 
all assertions made through the domain xyz.com 
 
My email client can then use a policy graph with 
policy statements that 1) guide me to use the 
blockchain to validate all of the statements above, 
and 2) validate each step in a policy graph up to 
compliance with a root policy. This would be in lieu 
of using X.509 cert chains. The policy graph may 
require me to check whether any of the statements 
have been controverted by later statements 
(amounting to revocation).  
Trust graphs can be embedded into a block chain 
as can policy graphs, that determine under what 
conditions I can trust an assertion, however the 
blockchain embedded policy graph will eventually 
Page 5671
lead my client to evaluate a locally embedded root 
policy with statements that are not embedded in the 
blockchain. It is this root policy that needs to be 
protected from alteration by other means, such as 
locally managed software integrity protection that is 
also part of the trust model. 
There are a number of considerations to be made 
for an open but governable assertion blockchain that 
can function, practically, as a universal oracle that 
can help us determine what to believe. One such 
consideration is confidentiality. We believe that a 
publicly accessible blockchain can be used for storing 
authenticators of confidential statements. This can be 
done by using hashes of public keys and hashes of 
the assertions, and supplying the full keys and 
assertion documents out of band, and under private 
governance, but in a way that authentication of 
provenance is still preserved. We will need to take 
care that correlations don’t make things easy to track. 
We are currently working on a number of approaches 
for that.  
Currently deployed systems that use blockchains 
like Bitcoin to immutably record assertions do not 
scale for use for IoT applications, where we need 
ultra- low cost, low latency, and large capacity in 
terms of transactions per second. The example above 
cited a familiar trust management task that we 
believe can be implemented more flexibly and 
effectively using blockchain embedded trust graphs 
and policy graphs. However, the absolute need for a 
new approach is shown by the following IoT 
example. 
 
4.4 Example: Trusting sensors 
 
Suppose that we want to forensically validate a 
photograph made with a digital camera, and sent 
anonymously to a news organization. Can we trust 
the image the photograph represents? A policy graph 
could guide us through a number of steps each one of 
which would require trust validation. Some assertions 
that will need to be checked are relatively static, 
while others will be part of a high-volume stream of 
assertion blockchain entries. This is because a trust 
decision would require an assertion from the raw 
photographic sensor in the device, and perhaps an 
assertion from the GPS device. Assertions from each 
of the software modules both within the original 
device containing the photographic sensor and from 
postprocessor modules that may lie outside of it. In 
cases where we might expect even a small probability 
that the authenticity and provenance of the sensor 
recording might be questioned, we could record these 
assertions in the block chain. We summarize just 
some of the assertions that might be required to 
verify chain of handling and control in the table 
below.  
 
The specifics may vary, depending on the way 
processes are composed within trusted modules. 
There are billions of photographic sensors in 
existence already, deployed by hundreds if not 
thousands of different device manufacturers, and 
while even in the future checking the authenticity and 
provenance of a photograph may not be required very 
often, we don’t know when and for what photograph 
we may need validation. Thus, we will need to record 
trust assertions from many sources: individual 
sensors, devices that house those sensors, 
manufacturers of the devices, originators of software 
post-processing apps, etc.  
This example involves the authentication of just 
one type of sensor, however there are many more 
types that will become increasingly relevant as we 
rely on sensor information for all kinds of decisions, 
including real-time decisions involved with the 
governance and operation of critical infrastructure. 
Contributions to a blockchain embedded trust graph, 
policy graph, in combination with provenance 
assertions for recordings and recording 
transformations for an increasing number of relevant 
sensors will need scale that no system has currently 
achieved. Permission-less blockchains that rely on 
byzantine consensus protocols that are based on proof 
of work or proof of stake will not scale. A blockchain 
approach that uses consensus approaches for writing 
to the blockchain that also includes contextual 
permissions may well do the trick.  
 
4.5 Assertion Blockchains with contextual 
write permissions 
 
 Although verification of the right to enter 
assertions into the blockchain can be done by 
referencing rights that have been asserted previously 
using the Blockchain, expediency and prioritization 
of assertions to be included and which will achieve 
Entity Blockchain recording 
Photo Sensor Sensor credentials, calibrations 
Raw output Hash of main sensor output file, other 
readings (time, GPS…) 
Device SW Software credentials 
Mobile Device Device credentials 
Output Photo Hash of main sensor file, process IDs 




Final Photo Hash of Photo with post-processing 
software IDs 
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consensus will require protocols that recognize the 
right to enter a new block by entities dependent on 
context. In currency transaction blockchains, miners 
can prioritize transactions even choosing according to 
transaction fee bidding. In addition, the protocol 
permits a new block only every ten minutes, and 
block size is fixed. These restrictions and approaches 
do not scale properly for many IoT assertion 
blockchain applications. Thus, a governance model 
for an assertion blockchain is required that allows 
flexible policy to determine who and when an entity 
has priority to write a block. The policy graph for 
governance will also be embeddable in the 
blockchain. A robust and well-defined governance 
model, and standards and rules for maintaining a 
policy graph for write permissions and consensus 
regarding the next block to be written and when, will 
be required. While an explicit governance model 
means the assertion blockchain is not completely 
open, it will negate the need for the massive overhead 
entailed by proof of work approaches and the 
artificial valuations required by proof of stake. We 
will require standards for governance, and 
certification of policy and the contextual permissions 
themselves.  
 
4.6 Other supportive cloud services 
 
Those who are owners of or are responsible for 
IoT devices can benefit from a number of cloud-
based services that we need to accommodate in the 
interaction part of the trust model, and may benefit 
from some standardization. The first class of these we 
will call Virtualization and Visualization services. 
Such services will allow virtual images of devices to 
appear in graphical depictions made available 
through cloud services. As a device is deployed it can 
appear in one or more depictions that provide its 
state, and allow a user to interact with the device 
through a richer UI. One of the benefits of this 
approach is that the web service can also simulate for 
the user the consequences of any configuration 
including how changes may affect safety, security, 
and privacy regarding a specific device that might be 
the subject of focus, but also other devices that might 
interact with that device. These services can also 
allow graphically aided configuration of composite 
devices, and simulate how these composite devices 
will work. Again, this will be tremendously useful for 
end-users who need to be informed of the safety, 
security, and privacy consequences of interactions 
among IoT devices. These simulations will be more 
robust and discernable if IoT device interactions are 
standardized to some extent.  
Since the virtualization and visualization services 
may do more than simulate possible interactions, 
rather they will be privy to actual configurations of 
devices, and change those configurations, we need to 
accommodate these services in the trust model, and 
there will need to be a well-understood and ideally 
standardized method of interaction between users and 
the V&V services and between those services and the 
actual devices.  
Another class of web service that will be helpful 
and which will have a big impact on the trust model 
will be data analytics services for data collected from 
device sensors, but also from event streams generated 
by IoT devices. These services can be granted 
permissions to collect a stream directly from the 
devices, or they could be given permissions to collect 
data from a web cache that collects data directly. In 
the latter case, a web service could get information 
from derived data, allowing perhaps only relevant 
data to be accessed. In any case the trust model here 
could become fairly complicated given the variety of 
policies that the web service may follow regarding 
the disposition of data, and their claims of ownership. 
We have seen examples of data collection where a 
manufacturer monitors internal sensors of industrial 
devices, yet will not share that information with the 
end user or device owner. One can see that use of IoT 
data for forensic reasons (what caused a failure) and 
for predictive maintenance will be valuable. Data 
ownership issues will need to be worked out, but 
from our point of view, we want to at least make data 
flow and data access explicit.  
One class of web service featuring data analytics 
that can be very supportive involves the analysis of 
event data to find security anomalies that could point 
to imminent attacks. This is a sensitive area, and an 
example where sharing data could benefit the 
common interest, even if it might reveal some 
information that might be considered proprietary. We 
believe such services will become fairly 
commonplace, as IoT devices will be vulnerable to 
systemic attacks and services that detect anomalous 
behavior will be useful for defending against such 
attacks. The trust model here will need to recognize 
the benefits and privileged access of these services, 
and the services will need to provide information 
regarding how data is protected, especially when 
some analytical approaches may involve comingling 
of different entity’s data.  
 
5. More on standards and governance 
 
As mentioned above, it is harder to agree on 
standards when so many stakeholders are involved, 
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and technology is moving fast. But, considering the 
end-user point of view as in [19], we realize that in 
order to contend with the scale and complexity of 
IoT, we will need to standardize on certain aspects of 
user interaction, nomenclature and other areas where 
lack of understanding could lead to safety and 
security hazards. We need to make choices about 
what to standardize and while in the software field 
we often are more concerned about interoperability, 
in this new world of IoT where software design can 
create physical hazards and lack of understanding by 
users can result in serious safety and security faults, 
standards will need to be motivated by user 
experience, and the need to limit complexity brought 
about by lack of standardization. While this is not 
completely new to the software world, we are going 
to need to deal with these issues more systematically. 
Consider standards for automotive operator UI. Some 
things are not standardized, like the location of light 
switches, but the brake pedal can be found in the 
same place on every car. There are higher level 
standards that deal with complexity of the automotive 
UI. See for example the overview published by the 
ITU-T focus group on driver distraction [20].  
We have been using a trust model to organize our 
thoughts and form the basis of reasoning about 
safety, security, and privacy. This led us far beyond a 
focus on devices themselves, and helped us consider 
their entire interactive context. We will review the 
components described above and discuss implications 
for standardization.  
Resources – we will need standards that 
encourage IoT device manufacturers to enumerate all 
accessible resources and demonstrate how access is 
protected using a reference monitor approach. We 
believe it will be helpful for resource nomenclature to 
be standardized so that users are less likely to be 
confused and overwhelmed when they need to 
manage IoT devices from different sources. 
A reference monitor should be a standard part of 
all IoT devices, and simply implemented in simple 
devices. Cloud services can help maintain the 
requisite security associations in more complex 
devices.  
Another standard aspect of IoT devices should be 
a documented interaction model that can be used 
when the device is evaluated to determine safety, 
security, and privacy properties. This model should 
show how resources are accessible by default, and 
how the reference monitor (or some interface to it) 
and root and dynamic policies affect interaction. This 
model should cover user, M2M, and cloud service 
interactions. We believe that interactions with other 
devices and services that collect data from IoT 
devices need to be explicitly highlighted with 
explanations of what data is collected, and what the 
service may do with it. We believe that the 
interaction model can be simplified using device 
virtualization (digital twin) approaches.  
Trusted attributes are labels that are applied to 
devices by trusted third parties. Nomenclature should 
be standardized, and standard ways of authenticating 
attribution should allow machine resident policies 
that reference those attributes to be properly 
executed.  
We have recommended that a universal standard 
assertion blockchain be used for immutably 
recording trusted attributes, indexed in a way that 
will allow them to be revoked or amended. 
Identity management schemes will need 
standardized formats for machine reference. An 
assertion blockchain should be used to record and 
authenticate identity relationships including 
relationships with public keys. 
Delegation schemes will need some aspect of 
standardization in order to avoid user confusion. 
Specifically, we will need standards that help ensure 
that delegation consequences are explicit.  
Performance aids, usually in the form of web 
services, that help expose delegation consequences 
and problems with composite device configurations, 
will need standard modalities for warnings and 
notifications. Standard policies for persistently 
providing certain types of warnings (say, related to 
safety or cyberattack) will need to be considered. 
 
6. Summary and related work 
 
We have analyzed the problems relating to IoT 
trust, safety, privacy, and security, and argued that 
traditional computer security approaches will not be 
effective. We have identified what we believe to be 
the most powerful and useful solutions based on an 
old and largely abandoned computer security 
approach (reference monitor), together with a system 
architecture approach making the reference monitor 
concept viable (categorization of resources and 
device virtualization), and a universal approach to 
trust management based on blockchains. Our goal has 
been to find a set of prescriptions for IoT trust that 
can be standardized without being overly 
constraining, and which can be used for IoT devices 
of all types. 
We have argued that the key to effective 
governance of IoT device resources is to simplify 
interaction models to the point that the reference 
monitor approach is feasible for large distributed 
systems, and while we point out that device self-
defense is the most scalable strategy, we have 
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discussed the use of cloud services and device 
virtualization (digital twins) that can provide 
performance aids for the maintenance of security 
associations and key management, relieving devices 
of the responsibility for the complex tasks those 
systems can involve, while simplifying the 
interaction model.  
Important related work is being done applying 
social graph concepts for trust management of IoT 
devices [21], especially for devices that operate more 
autonomously, making greater demands on our 
ability to reason about trust and automate its 
management.  
Additional related work is aimed at monitoring 
IoT device behaviors [22] in order to strengthen 
system security by identifying behavioral anomalies 
in device interactions. These technologies can be 
used in conjunction with dynamic policy 
management that can be administered using some of 
the infrastructure we advocate. 
To make trust management more effective, we 
introduced the possibility of using assertion 
blockchains to replace the use of the hierarchical 
X.509 certification schemes. Such an approach can 
be “open, but with governance.” That is, we can 
imagine a blockchain with embedded trust and policy 
graphs that anyone can use and rely on for virtually 
any kind of assertion relating to IoT devices, users, 
manufacturers and attributes, yet has trust anchors 
that can be used for root policies in applications. This 
blockchain will also feature governance policies that 
can ensure the scalability, proper functioning, and 
relatively smooth evolution of the blockchain.   
We wish to accelerate the debate on how much to 
standardize, and how strictly. The drivers of IoT we 
mentioned above make it necessary for open, public 
oversight of IoT system evolution to emerge.  
The concept of a universally accessible trust 
management oriented assertion blockchain that is 
subject to explicit governance will be controversial 
and a challenge to properly implement, but it seems 
so potentially comprehensive and adaptable that we 
will continue to better define and implement this 
approach. 
 
7. References  
 




[4] S. Sicari, A. Rizzardi, L.A. Grieco, A. Coen-Porisini, 
"Security,privacy and trust in Internet of Things: The road 
ahead", Computer Networks, Vol. 76,  pp. 146-164, Jan. 
2015.  
[5] Bernabe, J. B., Ramos, J. L. H., & Gómez-Skarmeta, A. 
F. (2016). TACIoT: multidimensional trust-aware access 
control system for the Internet of Things. Soft Comput., 
20(5), 1763-1779. 
[6] X.Xu, N.Bessis, J.Cao “An Autonomic Agent Trust 
Model for IoT systems”, Procedia Computer Science 21 
(2013) 107 – 113.  
[7] F.Bao, I-R Chen, “Dynamic trust management for 
internet of things applications”, Proceedings of the 2012 
international workshop on Self-aware internet of things 
Pages 1-6. 
[8] M.O’Neill, “Insecurity by Design: Today’s IoT Device 
Security Problem”, Engineering 2 (2016) 48–49. 
[9] K. Zetter, Countdown to Zero Day, Crown publishers, 
NY, NY, 2014 
[10] en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IFTTT 
[11] T. Jaeger, Encyclopedia of Cryptography and Security 
(2nd Ed.), Springer, NY, NY, 2011, pp. 1038-1040. 
[12] J. Anderson, 'Computer Security Technology Planning 
Study', ESD-TR-73-51, US Air Force Electronic Systems 
Division(1973).Section4.1.1 http://csrc.nist.gov/publication
s/history/ande72.pdf 
[13] M.Grieves, J.Vickers, “Digital Twin: Mitigating 
Unpredictable, Undesirable Emergent Behavior in Complex 
Systems”, in Transdisciplinary Perspectives on Complex 
Systems, F-J Kahlen, S. Flumerfelt, A. Alves, Editors, 
Springer International Publishing, Switzerland, 2017 
[14] W.B. Bradley, W.B., D.P. Maher, “The NEMO P2P 
service orchestration framework.” In System Sciences, 
2004. Proceedings of the 37th Annual Hawaii International 
Conference on (pp. 10-pp). IEEE. 
[15]  K.Christidis, M.Devetsikiotis “Blockchains and Smart 
Contracts for the Internet of Things”,  IEEE Access, 
2016, Vol. 4, Pages: 2292 - 2303 
[16] H.M. Kim, M. Laskowski,, Towards an Ontology-
Driven Blockchain Design for Supply Chain Provenance 
(August 23, 2016). Available at 
SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2828369 or http://dx.doi.o
rg/10.2139/ssrn.2828369 
[17] Y. Zhang, J. Wen, “The IoT electric business model: 
Using blockchain technology for the internet of things”, 
Peer-to-Peer Networking and Applications July 
2017, Volume 10, Issue 4, pp 983–994. 
[18] G. Bracha, Asynchronous Byzantine Agreement 
Protocols, Information and Computation vol. 75,2, Nov. 
1987; Elsevier, Amsterdam, NL. Pp. 130-143 
[19] D. Maher, https://www.oreilly.com/learning/a-human-
centric-trust-model-for-the-internet-of-things 
[20] ITU-T Focus group on Driver Distraction, Report on 
User Interface Requirements for Automotive Applications,  
www.itu.int/en/ITUT/focusgroups/distraction/Documents/d
eliverables/ , 2013. 
[21] M.Nitti, R.Girau, L.Atzori, “Trustworthiness 
Management in the Social Internet of Things”, IEEE 
Transactions on Knowledge and Data Engineering 
Year: 2014, Volume: 26, Issue: 5 Pages: 1253 – 1266 
[22] T.R.Fuller, G.E.Deane, “IoT applications in an 
adaptive intelligent system with responsive anomaly 
detection”, IEEE 2016 Future Technologies 
Conference(FTC), Page(s):754 - 762 
Page 5675
